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THE EFFECT OF INSIDER TRADING ON INSIDERS'
REACTION TO OPPORTUNITIES TO WASTE' CORPORATE VALUE
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes certain effects of insider trading on
the principal-agent problem in corporations. Specifically, we
focus on those managerial choices that confront managers with the
need tc decide between options that produce different corporate
value but do not differ in the managerial effcrt inVolved. In
the absence of insider trading, and as long as managers' salaries
are positively correlated with their firms results, managers
will make such choices efficiently, and consequently such choices
have previously received little attention, we show that, in the
presence of insider trading, managers may make such choices
inefficiently. With such trading, managers night elect to heve a
lower corporate value --thatis, they may 'waste' corporate
value --becausehaving such a value might enable them to make
greeter trading profits. We analyze the conditions under which
the problem we identify is likely to arise and the factors that
determine its severity. We also identify those restrictions en
insider trading that can eliminate this problem.
Lucian Bebchuk Chain Fershtman
Harvard Law School Department of Economics
1557 Massachusetts Avenue University of Tel-Aviv
Cambridge, MA 02138 Ramat-Aviv
Tel-Aviv, ISRAELI. INTRODUCTION
The managers of a corporation may wish to buy or sell shares
of their company. The legal rules of the United States, as well as
those of other advanced market economies, place significant limits
on the freedom of corporate insiders to engage in such trading. The
extent to which such trading by insiders is harmful and should be
constrained has been for long a central question for the regulation
of capital markets. Accordingly, it has been the subject of active
and intense public debate.
To the extent that the economic literature has analyzed
insider trading, it has focussed on the trading process itself.
Researchers studied, both theoretically and empirically, how the
possession of insider information enables insiders to make trading
profits, and analyzed how the presence of insider trading affects
the accuracy of market prices tin particular, by gradually
incorporating the insiders' information into the market price).'
While such analysis is clearly important, an evaluation of insider
trading clearly requires also an understanding of the ex ante
effects of such trading.
One important class of such ex ante effects consists of the
effects of insider trading on the ex ante management decisions of
Papers that develop models of trading and pricing decisions
in the presence of better informed traders include Glosten end
Nilgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Mirman and Samuelson (1989), and
Radner l979). These models show how the informed traders cam make
profits and how their trades lead gradually to the incorporation of
the traders' private information into the market price. Papers that
examine empirically the profitability of insiders' trades include
Finnezty (1976), Jaffe(l974), and Seyhum (1986). Finally, two
recent additions to this literature question the extent to which
insider trading improves the accuracy of market prices. Pishman and
Hagerty (1989) show that, while the presence of insider tradimg
leads to the incorporation of the insiders' information into the
market price, it might also discourage other traders from investimg
in the acquisition of other kinds of information and consequently
might make market prices less accurate," Laffont and Maskin (1990)
show that, if the informed trader is sufficiently large, there is
an eguilibrium in which his trading would not reveal his private
information,
1insiders. Economists have in the last decade devoted much attention
to the principal-agent problem in firms. Because insiders' behavior
cannot be perfectly monitored by shareholders, insiders may not
follow the value-maximizing course of action. Economists have
studied the level of "agency costs" --thatis, the amount lost due
to managers' deviation from value maximization --underdifferent
contractual features and corporate structures. Thus, it is natural
to ask whether trading by corporate insiders makes the principal-
agent problem better or worse. The possibility of trading obviously
changes managers' incentives; with insider trading, their
management decisions may be partly shaped by the desire to increase
their expected trading profits. The question, then, is whether the
introduction of this consideration brings management decisions
closer to, or further away from, the value-maximizing decisions.
While the law review literature is full of informal assertions and
speculations concerning this question,2 the economic literature has
thus far devoted little attention to it.3
This paper is part of a project aimed at modelling the
effects of insider trading on the agency problem in corporations.
In this paper, and the other parts of our project, we put forward
whet we view as the appropriate framework for examining these
effects. We seek to contrast the behavior of insiders under
contracts that allow and trading in the firm's shares and their
behavior under contracts that prohibit such trading. In our viev,
such comparison must be analyzed using a principal-agent model,
See, e.g., Carlton and Fischel (1983), Easterbroo}c (1985),
and Scott (1980).
The only two papers by economists un this general subject
are Leftwich and Verreochia (1983) and Dye (1984). These two papers
do not provide the analytical framework that we develop and viev as
necessary to study the effect of insider trading on the level of
agency cost. And, in any event, none of these papers considers the
type of managerial decisions on which this paper focusses.
2such as the one that we offer, that takes into account explicitly
all the relevant ex ante effects; among other things, it must take
into account how the treatment of insider trading affects other
I
compensationelements, and how the anticipated insider behavior
will be reflected in the ex ante market price which will be the
basis for subsequent insider trading.4
- Insidersmake different types of management decisions, and
we have found that the complexity of the subject makes it useful to
examine separately the effect of insider trading on each type of
insiders' decisions. The present paper thus focusses on one
important type of management decisions that insiders must make ——
theirreaction to opportunities to "waste" corporate value. (Other
types of management decisions are analyzed in Bebchuk and
Pershtman, 1989a, l989b).5 To analyze the effect of insider
trading on insiders' project choice, we compare the choices that
insiders make under contracts that allow insider trading with those
The effects on the agency problem are not the only ex ante
effects of insider trading, and some recent works look at other ex
ante effects, Specifically, Ausubel (1989) and Manove (1989)
examine the effect that insider trading might have on ex ante
investment even putting aside the agency problem. Because insider
trading reduces the expected return to the initial shareholders, it
might decrease their investment, Both papers abstract from the
agency problen on which we focus. Ausubel assumes that the
insiders make no management decisions. In tianove's model, the
insiders do make a decision —-theychoose the investment level ——
buthe assumes that in making this decision they do not maximize
their own rewards but rather are solely concerned with the
interests of the initial shareholders. (Manove's model thus seems
to apply better to trading by outsiders on the basis of inside
information than to trading on the basis of such information by
insiders). Abstracting from the agency problem, both authors also
Abstract from the question of insider compensation --theydo not
take into account, as we do, that allowing insider trading may
affect (and presumably would reduce) the expected salary that must
be given to insiders.
Bsbchuk and Fershtman (1989a) focusses on insiders' choice
among uncertain investment projects, and Bebchuk and Fershtman
{l989b) consider insiders' choice of their level of effort.
Together, our three papers attempt to cover the effects of insider
trading on all the different types of insiders' management
decisions.they would make under contracts that prohibit such trading. In
addition to determining the treatment nf trading, contracts alsn
naturally specify a salary, which may include both a fixed
compnnent and a compnnent that depends on results.
The aspect of insiders' behavior on which this paper
focusses is one to which economists have in the past paid nn
attention, for reasons to be made clear presently, and it thus
requires clarification. Suppose that a situation arises under
which the insiders must make a decision ——choosebetween A and B
——wherechoosing either way would involve practically the same
level of insider effort (and perhaps no or little effort) and would
not significantly change the risk facing the insiders. While A and
B are similar in the amount of effort and uncertainty that they
involve, one of them may well be better for the corporation, and it
would be desirable for the insiders to choose the value-increasing
option. Choosing otherwise would involve "wasting" or "throwing
away' corporate value. Such an insider choice, which is clearly
different fron the choice of effort level or the choice among
projects with different levels of risk, is likely to arise often in
the life of a company.
The reason why the literature investigating principal-agent
issues has not previously paid attention to such choices is
presumably the view, which is correct in the absence of insider
trading, that such choice, unlike those involving insider effort
or change in uncertainty level, are unproblematic. In the absence
of insider trading1 any contract that provides the insiders with
any positive fraction of the company's value would induce insiders
not to waste corporate value; insiders would have no reason to
bring about such a waste. Thus, the possibility of insiders
choosing, when a choice arises, to waste corporate value, can be
ignored.
As this paper shows, however, this is no longer the case in
4the presence of insider trading. When insiders can trade, they may
have a reason to cause corporate waste ——eitherby not preventing
• a loss or by not taking an advantage. Such a waste may lead to a
change in market price which the insiders can use to make trading
profits.
The model we develop enables us to study the reasons why
insider trading may produce such inefficient behavior as well as
the conditions under which, and the extent to which, such behavior
might arise. Note, for example, that a decision to waste value can
produce trading profits only if the waste is not already fully
reflected in the prior market price; this might happen if the waste
is brought about only with a probability because, say, the
opportunity to bring it about arises only with a probability.
Similarly, note that the insiders would bring about such a waste
•
only if the expected insider profits, which are made against the
background of a price that anticipates the possibility of some such
profits, exceed the adwerse effect that the waste of value would
• have on the other elements of the insiders' compensation. These
points and others emerge from our results concerning the conditions
under which inefficient behavior would arise, the frequency of such
behavior, and the magnitude of the resulting loss in value.
Having shown that allowing insiders to trade in the firm'
securities can lead them to make a decision to waste corporate
value, we examine which limitations on insider trading can
eliminate this problem. We show that the problem would not arise if
insider trading is limited to purchasing shares --thatis, if
insiders are allowed only to increase their holdings (whenever they
wish) but never to decrease them (until they leave office and stop
a
makingdecisions for the firm).
In assessing the importance and relevance of conclusions
about insiders' behavior in the presence of insider trading, it 5
importantto recognize that the world in which we live features a
5significant amount of such trading. The law does not totally
prohibit insiders from making trading profits. The law includes a
per se prohibition only with respect to insiders' profiting from
"short-swing" transaotions —-transactionsin which the insider
buys and then sells (or sells and then buys) within a six-month
period. But trading on the basis of private information might be of
course quite profitable even if one cannot close one's position
within six months. When insiders do not go in and out of the
company's stock within a six—month period, the law constrains their
trading only when it can be shown to be based on "material" inside
information. Because insiders' motive for trading is often not
observable or not verifiable, they often can openly make abnormally
profitabls trades, as the evidence indeed indicates (see, e.g.,
Jaffee (1974)). Furthermore, insiders may hide not their motive for
trading but rather the trading itself Much trading by insiders may
well go undetected.
Clearly, the amount of trading profits that insiders make is
a fumction of both the strictness of the legal and corporate
arrangements governing such trading and the expenditures on
enforcement. The trading profits that insiders now make are
presumably smaller than those that would be made in the absence of
any restrictions, and larger than those that would he made under a
regime that is harsher either in its rules or in its enforcement
efforts. Results on the consequences of insider trading thus have
both normative and positive implications. From a normative
perspective, they are relewant for assessing the optimal amount of
insider trading. From a positive perspective, and given that much
insider trading takes place at present, such conclusions are
necessary for a full understanding of actual insider behavior under
the existing legal regime.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
assumptions of the model. Sections III and IV analyze how insiders
6would react --withand without insider trading --whenfaced with
a choice between having and effortlessly preventing a certain loss
in expected corporate value. Section V extends the model to apply
• to the case in which the insiders face a choice between foregoing
or effortlessly getting a certain increase in the firm's expected
value. (As will be seen, the analysis of the choice between having
and foregoing e value increase is similar, but not equivalent, to
the analysis of the choice between foregoing and having a certain
• value decrease.) Section VI shows that the problem identified in
• the earlier sections would not arise if sufficient restrictions
were placed on investors' ability to decrease their holdings in the
firm's shares, Finally, Section VII makes concluding remarks.
II. FRAMEWORA OF ANALYSIS
The sequence of events in the model is as follows. In
Period 0, the managerial contract is specified. In Period 1, an
opportunity to 'waste" corporate value may arise, in which case the
managers must decide how to react to it. In Period 2, there is
trading in the firm's shares; the managers participate in this
trading if their contract allows them to do so. In Period 3, the
final period, the firm's output is realized. Our assumptions
concerning each of the elements of the model are described below.
Period 0: Contract Specification, At t —0,a company is
formed, and a contract is made between the shareholders (or the
entrepreneur setting up the firm and selling its shares to the
initial shareholders) and the managers (the "insiders"). The
contract provides the managers with some salary that increases in
the firm's final output (or the firm's final value). For
simplicity we focus on schemes that are linear in the firm's final
7output, denoted by W. Thus, the contract specifies some S and a,
oaa a 1, and the salary scheme is 5(W) —S+ aW. The company
gives the managers an amount S when the contract is made (if S is
negative, the company actually receives a payment from the
managers), and also gives them a right to receive a fraction a of
the firm's final output W. It is assumed that, due to limited
managerial wealth and/or enforcement problems, S cannot be lower
than some negative lower bound —D for some 0 >0.
Tm addition to providing the above "direct compensation,
the contract also specifies whether the managers will be allowed to
buy or sell shares of the company. We shall refer to contracts
prohibiting trading by insiders as NT (no-trading) contracts and to
those allowing such trading as IT (insider-trading) contracts. In
the case of an IT contract, we will denote by H the insider-trading
profits that the managers will make. The total compensation that
the managers will receive, which we denote by C(W), will be equal
to 5(W) under an UT contract and to 5(W) + IT under an IT contract.
Both managers and shareholders are assumed to be risk—
neutral. The managers have an alternative enplcyment vith expected
compensation of C. Thus, the contract made with the managers must
satisfy the managerial participation constraint EC(W) a C.
period 1: Managerial Reaction to pportunities to Waste
Corporate Value. In this period, a contingency P may arise, with
probability 0 < p a 1, in which case the managers will face an
opportunity to "waste" corporate value. Specifically, at this
stage we will assume that, if P arises and the managers do not take
a certain effortless action, the firm's expected output will
decrease by L. Thus, the managers' decision will be whether or not
6Inour modol, any scheme that is linear in the firm's final
output can be translated into some scheme that is linear in the
firm's final market value; and any scheme that is linear in the
firm's final value can be translated into some scheme that is
linear in the final output.
Sto prevent the expected loss L. (In Section V we will examine the
similar --butnot equivalent —-possibilityof the managers having
to decide whether or not to take an effortless action that will
increase expected output.) Outsiders cannot observe whether the
contingency P arose and, if so, how the managers reacted to it. As
a result, the firm's market value in this period, V, is equal to
the firm'sPeriod0 value, V,.
Period 2: Trading. Zn this period, trading in the firm's
shares takes place with the following participants: liquidity-
motivated sellers, a market maker (specialist) who sets the price,
add, under an ITcontract,also the insiders. We make the standard
assumptions about this trading. The liquidity sellers are some of
the initial shareholders who cannot defer realizing the value of
their shares until the final period. It is assumed that each of the
initial shareholders faces the seine probability of having to
liquidate his holdings during this trading period. The aggregate
supply of shares from liquidity sellers in (any given round of) the
trading is a random variable whose distribution is known by the
market maker. When insider trading is possible, the market maker
recognizes the presence of such trading but does not observe the
orders placed by the insiders; he observes only the nat aggregate
of orders, and can attempt to draw inferences about the direction
in which the insiders are trading only from this aggregate volume
and from his knowledge of the distribution of the liquidity
sellers' supply of shares. The market maker is assumed to make zero
profits.
Under an NT contract, the market maker knows that all those
who trade with him do not have private information. Therefore, the
price set will be equal to the market maker's (unconditional)
expectation of the firm's final value, and liquidity sellers will
not hawe to bear any losses due to their trading.
In contrast, under an IT contract, the market maker knows
9that some of the orders that went into the aggregate of net orders
were made by better informed insiders. Such trading has been
already analyzed in detail by Kyle l985) and by Glosten and
Milgrom (1985). They have modelled how the market maker will set
his price ——tobreak even, the market maker will have to set his
price below his (unconditional) expectation of the final value -—
andhow the insiders' information will gradually become ref lacted
in the market maker's price. There is of course no reason to
duplicate here the analysis of these models, and we will simply
rely on their conclusions.
For our purposes, what is important to recognize is that, as
has been established by the above literature, the trading under an
IT contract has the following features. First, the insiders can
make some profits; for, initially the market maker will not be able
to tell for sure whether the insiders are selling or buying.
Second, even though the insiders can make profits, they can capture
only part of the gap between the pre-trading value, which we denote
by 110w and the firm's final value, which we denote by V,7 for one
thing, as the insiders trade more shares, their information will be
increasingly reflected in the prices set by the market maker.
Specifically, we assume that the insiders' expected profits from
trading are V, -vIfor some 0 'C< 1.(In Section VI we will
refine this assumption to consider the case in which the managers'
expected profits are jv, -vjwhen \T, > V0 and pjv, -v,Iwhen
C 0, with• .)ofcourse, the insiders' expected trading
profits all come at the expense of the liquidity sellers, as the
market maker is assumed to make zero expected profits.
Period 3: Realization. In this period, the fin's output W
is realized. The expected output is W unless the contingency P
arose and the managers decided to "waste' value, in which case the
10expected value of W is W —L.7The finn's final value is
V1 =(1—u)W-S.The story ends now: the firm dissolves; or
alternatively, a new contract is made with the managers.
The Shareholders' obiective. In designing the managerial
contract, the initial shareholders (or the entrepreneur who sets up
the company and sells the shares to them) wish to maximize V0.
Note that, for any contract that makes the participation
constraint binding, V0 will equal 2W —C.Therefore, among such
contracts, the shareholders wish to have the contract that would
lead the managers to maximize the expected output EW. We have
intentionally structured the model so that the only way in which
the managers can affect EW is through their Period 1 reaction to
opportunities to waste corporate value. Let k, 0 s k ￿ 1, denote
the managers' Period 1 strategy -—kis the probahility that, if
the contingency P arises, the managers will choose to lose the
value L. Clearly, among the set of contracts that make the
participation constraint binding, the shareholders would like a
contract that would induce the managers to choose the strategy
k —0.
In •INSIDERBEHAVIOR AND CORPORATE VALUE WITHOUT INSIDER TRADING
Let usfirst look at behavior and value under NT contracts,
which are straightforward to analyze. Under any NT contract,
(S,a),theinsiders will seek to maximize E(S ÷aW). Consequently,
forany a > 0, managers will wish to maximize EW and hence, if P
occurs, they will always choose to prevent the loss L. Therefore:
W will be equal to its expected value plus some "noise term
€.Tothe extent that the managers learnbeforethe investors
do, they may engage in some profitable trading. In order to
abstract from the possibility of such trading, we assume that the
insiders and outsiders all learn iatthe same time. We wish to
abstract from this possibility because insiders' ability to make
tradingprofits on private information concerning cwould not
affecttheir Period 1 reaction to opportunities to waste value.
11Proposition !: Under any NT contract with a >0,managers' optimal
strategy is IC —0.
Note that, under an NT contract, liquidity sellers will not
bear expected losses, Consequently,
(1) V,EV,EW—(S+ nEW) —(1-a)W
—S.
To make the participation constraint binding for a given a,
the fixed salary S must satisfy
(2) S—C-nW.
Because S cannot he below —0, it may not be possible to make
the participation constraint binding. (Specifically, when
a >(C +D)IW, lowering S to its minimum level, —0, will provide
managers with expected compensation aw —D,which is higher than
the competitive level C.) However, as long as a is chosen below
(C+ 13)1W,the participation constraint can be made binding. From
Proposition 1 and the above discussion, we can conclude the
following:
Corollary !: There are always NT contracts (specifically, all
those with a ￿(C + D)/W) that wouldyield the highest possible
initial value, '4= W—C.
IV. INSIDER BEHAVIOR j.ND CORPORATEVALUE WITH INSIDER TRADING
A.Insider Behavior
Whereasunder an NT contract the managers' compensation (and
thus their choice of Ic) does not depend on V,, this is no longer
the case under an IT contract. Under such a contract, the
managers' compensation includes the expected trading profit 11,
which clearly depends on V,. Thus, the managers' strategy Ic
depends on the initial value V,, and at the same time the initial
valueV0 must reflect the anticipated value of k. We let EII(v01k)
12denote the expected managerial trading profit as a function of the
initial value and managers' strategy, and state the conditions that
a (rational expectations) equilibrium must satisfy:
Definition 1: A rational expectations equilibrium is (V,k) such
that
(i) 1c is the managers' optimal strategy given
the initial value V, i.e.,
(3) Ic' {k £[0,111k=ArgJ{ax[S + cxEW{k) ÷ F.fl(V,k)]}.
(ii) V is the expected final value EV, (given the
strategy choice k') minus the managers' total
compensation, i.e.,
(4) V(k} =E[(1—ct)W(k)—SJ—Efl(V(k),k').
Given an initial value managers decide whether to waste
value (if P occurs) by comparing the -ctL reduction in salary that
would result from wasting value with the expected increase in
trading profits that they might realize from choosing another
strategy. Before turning to identify the equilibrium for any IT
contract (S,a), let us first state the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Suppose that in equilibrium shareholders expect the
managers' strategy to be k =0.Then:
(i) the expected insider trading profits are
(5) EI1(v;(o),o) =[(1—0p)2Op/(l—(l—20p))](v—
whereV is the final value when the loss L occurs
end Visthe final value when it does not.
(ii) the difference between the insiders' trading profits
when the loss L occurs and when it does not occur
is:
13(6) All{(26p —1+ )/(l —(l—28p))J(V—V).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 2: IC —0(managers never waste value) in an
equilibrium if and only if< a/(l —a).
Proof: For IC —0the equilibrium initial value is V =
(1—a)W—S.Given such v, suppose that contingency P occurs. If
the managers prevent the loss they will have a salary S ÷ aW, but,
given V, will not be able to make any trading profits. If the
managers choose to have the loss; they will expect V1 to be
(1 —a)(W—L)—5,and will be able to make trading profits.
Thus, if they chuose not to prevent the loss, their total
compensation will be
(7) S + cz(W —L)+ PI— v;.
Substituting for V1 and V and simplifying yields that
managerial payoffs from letting the loss occur are S + W -UL+
—a)L.Comparing these payoffs with the payoffs associated
with preventing the loss implies that the managers are better off
by choosing IC =0as long as< a/(1 -a).U
Remark: The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows, aD is
the direct reduction in salary caused by letting the loss I occur,
while (l —a)Lis the trading profits that managers can make if
they let the loss occur. The condition in the ahove proposition
indicates that these trading profits are smaller than the reduction
in salary.
Note that the equilibrium with IC —Uexists either when a
is large enough or whenis small enough. In this oase the direct
effect on salary is large relative to the possible gains from
insider trade.
14fpcsition 3: There is an equilibrium with k =1if and only if
8 _______
1—aPl_p+2pp
Proof: When k =1the shareholders expect that with probability p
contingency P will arise, the value L will be wasted, and the
expected final value will be
(9) =(I—a)(W—L)—
andthat with probability 1 -p,the final value will be
(10) =(1—a)W—S.
Given V, managers will prefer to let the loss occur only if
the resulting effect on trading profits, All, is higher than the at
reduction in direct salary caused by the loss. Thus, k' =1is
optimal as long as
(11) —at + All> 0.
Using Lemma1to substitute for All yields that condition
(11) can be rewritten as
(12) —aL + l_(l_2P)'("t —V)> 0.
Prom (9) and (10) we can verify that V —= -(I—a)L.
Substituting in (12) and rearranging yields that playing k' =1is
optimal if and only if equation (8) holds. N
Remark 1: The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows, When
k' =1the initial value v is between V and V and thus enables the
managers always to make trading profits. Given such v, the
managers' choice of k =1is optimal only if (i) the direct loss
of salary -ciL plus the trading profits (v -V})that can be made
by letting the loss occur are larger than (ii) the trading profits
15- V)that can be made by preventing the loss. To satisfy this
conditionshould be sufficiently above a, and p should he
sufficiently low, so that v; will be closer to V than to V. The
condition of the proposition guarantees that these conditions be
satisfied.
Remark .iForp —1condition (8) can be rewritten as a/(l —a)C
-l)/(i+ )-— whichcannot he satisfied as long asand a
are positive. Thus, Proposition 3 implies that, if the opportunity
to waste value always arises, i.e., p —1,it will not be always
used by insiders. The reason for this is that, if the opportunity
to waste value always arises and is always used, then the waste of
value will be certain and will be fully reflected in V, and
consequently letting the loss occur will not enable insiders tu
make any trading profits.
Propositions 2 and 3 imply that when
—— 2p)/(1— ÷ 2p) C a/(l —a}C ,thereis no
equilibrium with pure strategies. Under such a value of the
parameters, the value V that is associated with k =0would lead
the managers to choose k =1,for, with such v, the trading
profits that would result fron letting the loss occur would be
large. Similarly, the low value of v that is associated with
=1would lead the insiders to choose k =0.But even though a
pure strategy equilibrium does not exist for such values of the
parameters1 a mixed strategy equilibrium does exist.
Proposition !Forevery a, ,andp such that
13 l--2p a l—+21p 1—a






16Proof: When contingency P occurs, the strategy 1 >k>0will be
optimal only if the managers are indifferent between letting the
loss occur and preventing it. Letting the loss occur will result
in a salaryreductionof aL which needs to be covered by the extra
trading profits that having the loss will enable. Specifically, a
mixed strategy equilibrium exists if and only if -uL + Mi =0,
where, as before, All is the difference between the trading profits
that the insiders can make if they let the loss occur and the
profits that they can make if they prevent the loss. Using Lemma 1
to substitute for Mi yields
(15) —uL +l—(l—2kp)(14_14)0.
From (9) and (10) we obtain that 14—14=—(1-u)L.Substituting
• in (15) and rearranging terms yields the equilibrium mixed strategy
(14). I
• Putting Propositions 2 —4together, it is easy to see that
foreach value of the parameters, there is one and only one
equilibrium. Specifically, putting the three propositions together
gives:
Proposition 5: For any IT contract, there is a unique equilibrium
strategy characterized by
cc





(16) k*_ ,if f3 < < (3;and
2p(3 l—(3+2(3p 1—a
a 1—(3—2p 1, 1 1—a1 —(3+2(3p
From Proposition 5,it isevident that, whenever (3 exceeds
17a/(l -a)k will be positive and insiders will sometimes waste
value. For example if a1%, them it is sufficient forto
exceed 1.01% for the equilibrium to include some waste.
Alternatively, there will be some expected waste if a is
below /(l + ). Note also that, once a satisfies this condition,
a further decrease im a implies a greater expected loss as
ôpk/8a =— (1—2)/2'C 0. The expected waste will get to its
highest value once a is sufficiently low to induce the strategy
—1.
B. Maximal Corporate value with Insider Trading
Since the participation constraint implies that insiders'
total expected compensation cannot be below C, the maximum possible
value of V is W —Cand it will be achieved only if the managers
are induced to choose W =0.As was shown in Seotion III, any NT
contract with a > 0 would load to the choice k' 0.In contrast,
ae the first part of this Section has shown, under an IT contract
0 will be induced only if a> /(l +
Raising a to the level of /(1 + ) might be costly. First,
when the firm's returns are uncertain and the managers are risk
averse, increasing a will increase the risk bearing costs borne by
managers. This type of cost is absent from our model aswe assume
risk—neutral managers. The second way in which increasing a may be
costly —-andthe one we chose to introduce in our model ——results
from limited managerial wealth, Because we assume that S cannot be
decreased below some lower bound -B, increasing a might require
giving the managers a compensation in excess of C. Specifically if
(17)
them increasing a to the level of /(1 + )willrequire paying the
managers more than C (because only S below —D will be sufficiently
negative to make the participation constraint binding).
18Proposition 6: There is no IT contract that will produce the
maximalvalue ofV0 W -Cif
p C+D
(18) >— 1+ W
Proof: When condition (18) holds, at least one of the following
two things must occur —-(i)ci being below 81(1 + ),or(ii) the
insiders'compensation exceeding E.Eitherone will be sufficient
toproduce an initial value lower than— . I
Whenis sufficiently small it is possible to deviss a
compensation scheme such that managers in equilibrium will not
waste value and yet their compensation does not exceed C.
Specifically, using Proposition 6, we can conclude the following:
Corollary .1Theexistence of opportunities for insiders to waste





For example, assuming that C =0.02Wand that -D =-0.01W,
then fmustbe kept below a percent to avoid reductions in
corporate value. Only with such a low level of Pwillit be
possible to design an IT contract that will both induce managurs to
choose k 0 and provide them with compensation not exceeding C.
V. OPPORTONITIES TO INCREASE VALUE
We continue to make the same assumptions as before with one
difference: we now assume that, if contingency P occurs in Period
1, the managers can, by taking an effortless action, increase the
expected output from w to W + G. Thus, if P occurs and the
managers do not take advantage of the opportunity to increase
value, they will be 'wasting corporate value. In the considered
19situation, the highest possible initial value is W -I-pG—C.As
before, k will denote the equilibrium strategy of the insiders -—
thatis, the probability that, if P oocurs, the insiders will elect
to waste value (i.e., will not take advantage of the opportunity
to raise value)
Using the methods of the preceding part, we can establish
the propositions stated below. The proofs of these propositions
are all relegated to the Appendix, but the text includes a remark
that explains intuitively the difference between the eguilibriun
results in this Section and in the preceding one.
Proposition 7: Under any NT contract with a >0,managers will
choose k =0.Moreover, there is always a set of NT contracts
that would produce the highest possible initial value of
(20) V,=W+pG—C.
Proposition .E.:Underan IT contract:
(i) There is no equilibrium with k' =1.
(ii) k 0 is an equilibrium if and only if
21 a 2p—l—g3
(1 —a) 1 +— 2pfS
(iii) There is a mixing equilibrium (0 CkC1)if and only
if
22 a< 2p—1—f
(1—a) 1 + —2p
in which case the equilibrium strategy is:
(23) )C=l— 2p
Remark: The differences between the equilibrium im this case and
the case discussed in the previous Section may be best understood
20by considering the lotteries induced by the strategy k. In both
Sections, there are two possible final values, a high value and a
low value. In Section IV, when the contingency P implies a
possible loss, the probability of having the lnw value is pk. In
this Section, when P implies a possible gain, the probability of
having the low value is 1 -p+ pk. When p =Ithe two lotteries
are identical and yield equivalent results. When p 'C1,however,
the two cases are not identical. As we can see from the above
probabilities, when P implies a possible loss, then the probability
of having the low value is zero if k =0;in contrast, when P
implies a possible gain, the possibility of ending up with the low
value exists even with k —0.It is exactly this difference that
yields the different types of equilibrium.
For example, when P implies a possible gain, there is no
equilibrium with k =1;for such a strategy would imply that the
low value is certain, no trading profits would be possible, and
playing k =1would thus not be optimal. When P implies a possible
loss, even playing k =1does not imply that the low value would
result with certainty; thus, the initial value would be between the
• two possible values, trading profits would be possible, and
consequently there may be an equilibrium with k 1 (Proposition
3).
• Proposition !: There is no IT contract that produces the highest




VI.RESTRICTIONS ON INSIDER TRADING
Thusfar we have analyzed the conditions under which, taking
the profitability of insider trading as given, the presence of such
21trading reduces corporate value by leading insiders to 'waste"
corporate value. In this section, we identify certain restrictions
on insider trading that would address the identified problem.
A. Prohibiting Insiders from Ever Decreasing Their Holdings
Let us first consider & restriction that would prohibit
insiders, as long as they are in office, from ever selling shares
but leave then free to buy shares. Note that the considered
restriction is much stricter than a prohibition on insiders'
selling short their company's shares: the restriction under
consideration would prohibit insiders from ever decreasing their
holding even if such a decrease would leave them with a long
position in the company's stock.
Note that the considered restriction would still enable
managers to use their private information to make trading profits.
They would be able to profit by increasing their holdings when they
get private information that is "good news". They would only be
precluded from adjusting their position downward on the basis of
bad news.
Let us denote by iT" a contract that allows insiders to
increase their holdings but not to decrease them. And let us
suppose that the restriction on insiders' decreasing their holdings
is perfectly enforced. Under such an IT" contract, the insiders'
trading profits will be (V -V0)if V1 > V, and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 101 Under any IT contract with a > 0, managers will
always follow the strategy k' =0;that is, they will never waste
value.
Proof: We will prove the proposition for the case of potential
loss. The case of potential gain can be proven in a similar way.
Let us first prove that there is an equilibrium with Ic" =0.
Given k =0,the initial value of the firm is v =(1—a)W—S.
22By leading to a loss, managers will decrease their salarybyol
• without being able to compensate themselves by increased trading
profits, as they cannot reduce their holding.
Letusnow werify that there is no other equilibrium. For
every equilibrium with k >0,the initial value is V —
kpL—C.Given this V, the optimal managerial strategy is k 0,
as it would give the managers both a higher salary and increased
trading profits. I
Remark: That the ITcontractleads to efficient insider behavior
can be explained intuitively as follows. It is not insider trading
profits per se that could lead to inefficiency but rather only
trading profits based on bad news. Under an IT' contract, managers
still can benefit from getting private information that is good
• news". But being able to benefit from "good news' cannot induce
managers to waste corporate value. IT' prevents insiders from
profiting from bad news; consequently, it eliminates any incentive
to produce bad news by wasting ccrporate value.
B.Restrictions that Reduce the Profitability of Trading on Bad News
Preventing insiders from ever decreasing their holdings may
not be feasible or desirable for two reasons. First, such
restriction may not be possible to enforce perfectly; that is, even
if the restriction is adopted, some sales may go undetected.
Second, a flat prohibition on insiders decreasing their holdings
may be viewed as imposing severe liquidity costs on insiders.
Thus, the question arises whether it may be possible to address the
problem identified in this paper by reducing, rather than
eliminating, insiders' ability to profit from trading on bad news.
To study this question, let us suppose that restrictions and
enforcement measures have been adopted that naks the expected
profits from trading on bad news lower than those from trading on
good news. Specifically, let us assume that the insider trading
23profits will be p1(V, -'1,) ifVf > V, and ,(VQ —V)if V, < V, with
0 < < fi1.
Proposition11: when p implies a possible loss, k =0is an
equilibrium if
(25) C cz/(l —ci).
Proof: Given k =0,the initial value is v —(1—ct)W—S.Given
such V, playing k —1provides managers with a(W -L)÷ S+
— [(1—a)(W —L)—5]),while playing k =0provides them
with ciW + S. The condition 2 C 01(1 —a)can be shown to guarantee
that playing k =0is optimal. I
In a similar way and following the methods of the proof of
Proposition S in the Appendix (with 1wp2),wecan prove the
following proposition.
Prqppsition 12: When P implies a possible gain, k —0is an
equilibrium if
26
ci> P(1 + ,)— (l+ f3,}
1 —ci 1 + 2(l —pj—
VII.CONCLUSION
This paper has shown that, in the presence of trading in
shares by insiders, it is no longer certain that insiders will not
"waste" corporate value. The paper has identified the conditions
under which a problem may arise. Whether this problem would arise
depends on how cc, the fraction of changes in corporate value that
managers experience through their salary schemes, compares with )3.
the fraction of the gap between market price and true value that
insiders can capture by trading.
Having identified this problem, the paper has also
investigated which restrictions on trading can eliminate it. One
24such sufficient restriction, would prohibit insiders from
decreasing (but not from increasing) their holdings in their
company's stock as long as they serve the company. Under this
restriction, insiders would still be able to make some trading
profits by increasing their holdings when their private information
is favorable. But since they would be able to make trading profits
only from good news, they would have nc reason to produce bad news.
More generally, the analysis of this paper suggests that the
extent to which insiders may trade in their firm's shares has
considerable effects on the agency problem in corporations. Thus,
an understanding uf these effects is necessary for both (1)
designing the corporate and legal arrangements governing insider
trading, and (ii) forming an accurate picture of the agency problem
in corporations. we have sought in this paper to contribute to the




(A.1} V .0p14 +(1 —Op)V—Efl(V,8)
and
(A.2) EfI(V,O) =Op(V— +(1—Op)(V—
substituting(A.l) into (A.2) and arranging yields
(A.]) Efl(V,8) —1( (V—VflI.
Once the contingency P occurs, the difference in the insider trade










Proof of Proposition j:
Givenan NT contract with a > 0, any deviation from the
strategy k'0 will yield a loss of salary, Since a can be made
arbitrarily small, it is possible to choose S =C-cz(W+ p0) >0.
Given such S the initial value is as stated by (20). I
Proof of Proposition 8:
(i) Given the strategy (C =1and assuming that a is
sufficiently low such that it is possible to find S =C—oWs -0,
26the initial value is V, =W—C.(If there is no such 5, V0 will be
even lower, but our following argument will still hold.) Now
• notice that, given such V,, the managers' optimal strategy is to
play Ic =0.By playing Ic —0when contingency P occurs, the
managers get additional salary of aG and can also gain (1 -a)Gby
insider trade.
(ii) Given that P occurs, playing k —0implies the final
value V =(1—a)(W+ C) -S.When P does not occur the final
value is V =W(l-a)—S.The initial value of the finn when
Ic =0is
(A.5} (1 —p)V+ pV) —Ffl(V,0)
Given this 'z; the expected insider trade profits is
(A.6) Erl{v;,o) (1 —p)(V—\4) +p(V —V)
From (A.5) and (A.6) we obtain the expected insider trade
profits when Ic =0:
(A.1} E1i(V,0) =2p(l—pO(ljs4ic
Oncecontingency P occurs, playing Ic =0is optimal if and only if
(A.S) cC + (V —V)>)3(V—V)
Using (A.5) and (A.7) to substitute for v and Eli in (A.B)
yields that the condition that guarantees that playing Ic =0is
optimal is
AS" a >E2P_lJ1
• (1 —a) 1 + —2p
(iii) When contingency P Occurs, a strategy 1 >k*> 0 is
optimal when managers are indifferent between Ic =0and Ic =1.
Following the proof of part 'ii) we can calculate the initial
condition and the expected insider trade profits for 1 > Ic > 0.
27The indifference condition implies that
A 10 — — km—1—Th_
1 —a
—F1 + —2p(1—
Solving(A.lO) yields the equilibrium strategy k*. I
Proof of gposition 9:
Proposition 8 (ii) yields that if condition (21) does not hold,
then if managers have an IT type contract there will be an expected
waste of value. Owners can increase the level of a such that
condition (21) holds. Thus rearranging (21) yields that if
(A.11) a a L :r
therewill be no waste of value. Such a level of a however night
mean that
(A.12) C- ct(W+ p0) <-D
which implies that the participation constraint is not binding and
that the managerial compensation exceeds C. Substituting the
required level of a from (A.l1) into (A.12) yields condition (24).U
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